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PRETEXTUAL SEARCHES AND 
SEIZURES: ALASKA’S FAILURE 
TO ADOPT A STANDARD 
SHARDUL DESAI 
A decade has passed since the United States Supreme Court set an 
objective standard for testing the legality of pretextual searches 
and seizures under the Fourth Amendment.  Due to the greater 
protection of privacy under the Alaska Constitution, it is possible 
that a stricter standard would prevail in Alaska.  However, Alaska 
courts have yet to address whether and under what circumstances 
such searches are valid under the state constitution.  In recent 
cases involving pretextual searches and seizures the Alaska courts 
have avoided the state constitutional question entirely and have 
even applied the wrong standard under the Fourth Amendment.  
This Note highlights the need for the courts to resolve definitively 
whether the Alaska Constitution imposes a stricter standard 
beyond that set by the Fourth Amendment; author argues that it 
ultimately does not. 
 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
“The poorest man may, in his cottage, bid defiance to all the 
forces of the Crown.  It may be frail; its roof may shake; the wind 
may blow through it; the storm may enter; the rain may enter; but 
the King of England may not enter; all his force dares not cross 
the threshold of the ruined tenement.”1  – William Pitt 
 
Freedom from government intrusion lies at the very 
foundation of Western law and culture, and is one of our nation’s 
most cherished freedoms.  As the Alaska Supreme Court has 
stated, “[c]ertainly the . . . guarantee against unreasonable searches 
and seizures is at the very core of the protections needed to 
preserve democracy against the excesses of government.”2 
 
Copyright © 2006 by Shardul Desai. 
 1. NELSON B. LASSON, THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 49–50 (1937). 
 2. McCoy v. State, 491 P.2d 127, 138 (Alaska 1971). 
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To deter unreasonable searches and seizures, evidence 
collected by illegal means is generally inadmissible at trial.3  
However, there is a good-faith exception to this rule: evidence 
collected in an illegal search and seizure may nevertheless be 
admissible if the officer reasonably believed, in good faith, that the 
search was legal.4  This good-faith exception raises the issue of 
whether a bad faith exclusionary principle may also exist.  That is, 
whether evidence obtained in an otherwise valid search can be 
suppressed when an officer acted in bad faith.  So-called pretextual 
searches and seizures, or pretexts, fall into this category.5 
Pretexts occur when the police use a legal justification to make 
a stop and conduct a search for an unrelated crime for which they 
do not have the probable cause or the reasonable suspicion 
necessary to support a stop.6  A common example, and the kind 
most frequently litigated, is a vehicle stop for a minor traffic 
violation when an officer subjectively desires to investigate 
another, non-traffic-related crime.7  Because pervasive regulations 
tend to preclude total compliance with traffic and safety laws, 
allowing pretexts would seem to subject drivers to “unfettered 
police discretion.”8  Such discretion would permit traffic stops 
based on arbitrary or discriminatory characteristics.9  The New 
York Court of Appeals indicated the reality of this situation: “We 
are not unmindful of studies . . . which show that certain racial and 
ethnic groups are disproportionately stopped by police officers, and 
that those stops do not end in the discovery of a higher proportion 
of contraband than in the cars of other groups.”10 
 
 3. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 655 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 
U.S. 383, 391–93 (1914). 
 4. United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 922 (1983); see also Massachusetts v. 
Sheppard, 468 U.S. 981, 988 (1984) (extending the Leon rule); WAYNE R. 
LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.3 
(4th ed. 2004) (providing an extended analysis on the Leon good-faith exception). 
 5. LAFAVE, supra note 4, § 1.4. 
 6. Many courts and commentators have defined the meaning of “pretext.”  
The definition used here is a synthesis of some of the more common definitions.  
See United States v. Cannon, 29 F.3d 472, 474 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing United States 
v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1515 (10th Cir. 1988)); People v. Robinson, 767 N.E.2d 
638, 642 (N.Y. 2001); Jeffery M. Kaban, Note, Alaska, the Last Frontier of Privacy: 
Using the State Constitution to Eliminate Pretextual Traffic Stops, 55 HASTINGS L.J. 
1309, 1309 (2004); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 117 (8th ed. 2004) (pretextual 
arrest). 
 7. See Kaban, supra note 6, at 1309. 
 8. Cannon, 29 F.3d at 475 (quoting Guzman, 864 F.2d at 1516). 
 9. Id. 
 10. Robinson, 767 N.E.2d at 644. 
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In Whren v. United States,11 the Supreme Court determined 
that pretexts are legal under the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. 
Constitution.12  The issue has never been addressed under the 
Alaska Constitution.  Since Whren, six cases in the Alaska Court of 
Appeals have questioned the legality of pretexts under article I, 
section 14 of the Alaska Constitution.  In both Hamilton v. State13 
and Way v. State,14 the court of appeals avoided the issue by 
narrowly defining pretexts.  In Nease v. State,15 the court declined to 
address the pretext question under the state constitution.16  Indeed, 
the Nease court implicitly applied an obsolete standard—the 
reasonable officer standard—to pretexts under the Fourth 
Amendment, relying on a treatise published before the Whren 
opinion.17  Finally, Olson v. State,18 Grohs v. State,19 and Marley v. 
State20 all served to reaffirm the law established in Nease. 
This Note argues that the Alaska Court of Appeals erred in 
avoiding the pretext question under the Alaska Constitution and 
implicitly and erroneously adopted the reasonable officer standard.  
Further, a thorough analysis of pretexts under the Alaska 
Constitution demonstrates that Alaska should adopt an objective 
standard.  Part II of this Note will discuss the adoption of, and the 
rationale behind, the three approaches to pretexts: the objective 
standard, the reasonable officer standard, and the subjective 
standard.  To accomplish this task, this section will provide a 
general overview of the Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and the 
adoption in federal courts of the objective standard and the 
reasonable officer standard.  Finally, this section will discuss the 
illegality of pretexts under the State of Washington’s constitution 
and that state’s adoption of the subjective standard.  Part III will 
discuss pretextual search-and-seizure case law in Alaska.  First, a 
general overview of Alaska’s search-and-seizure law will provide 
the framework within which pretexts can be discussed.  This 
overview will illustrate that the Alaska Constitution provides 
broader privacy protection than the Federal Constitution.  Next, 
the section will discuss relevant case law related to pretexts as well 
 
 11. 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
 12. Id. at 820. 
 13. 59 P.3d 760, 766 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002). 
 14. 100 P.3d 902, 904 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004). 
 15. 105 P.3d 1145 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005). 
 16. Id. at 1148. 
 17. Id. at 1148–50. 
 18. No. A-8595, 2005 Alas. App. LEXIS 69 (Alaska Ct. App. July 20, 2005). 
 19. 118 P.3d 1080 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005). 
 20. No. A-9285, 2006 Alas. App. LEXIS 80 (Alaska Ct. App. May 3, 2006). 
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as the recent six cases that raised the pretext question under the 
Alaska Constitution.  Finally, Part IV will illustrate that the court 
of appeals reached erroneous conclusions in Hamilton, Way, and 
Nease.  Furthermore, the discussion will reveal that regardless of 
greater privacy protections of the Alaska Constitution, the relevant 
Alaska case law supports the adoption of the objective standard. 
II.  FOURTH AMENDMENT AND THE PRETEXT STANDARDS 
A. Overview of Fourth Amendment Search-and-Seizure Law 
The Fourth Amendment is the Constitution’s guarantor of 
personal security.  It provides: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, 
papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and 
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons 
or things to be seized.21  
The Supreme Court has stated that “the Fourth Amendment 
protects people, not places.”22  An individual shall be free from 
unreasonable governmental intrusion wherever he may harbor a 
reasonable “expectation of privacy.”23  A “seizure” under the 
Fourth Amendment occurs whenever an officer accosts an 
individual and restrains his freedom to leave.24  Therefore, a traffic 
stop, even for a brief period of time, constitutes a “seizure.”25 
Warrantless searches and seizures are “per se unreasonable” 
unless they fall under one of the narrowly recognized exceptions to 
the warrant requirement.26  Under these exceptions, there are three 
categories of permissible warrantless automobile stops: (1) a search 
 
 21. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 22. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967). 
 23. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 9 (1968) (citing Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., 
concurring)). 
 24. Id. at 16. 
 25. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 809–10 (1996); Delaware v. Prouse, 
440 U.S. 648, 653 (1979). 
 26. Katz, 389 U.S. at 357.  The exceptions are: (1) searches of abandoned 
property; (2) searches in hot pursuit of a fleeing felon; (3) searches, with probable 
cause, to avoid destruction of a known seizable item; (4) searches, with probable 
cause, of a movable vehicle; (5) inventory searches; (6) searches pursuant to 
voluntary consent; (7) searches in the rendition of “emergency aid”; (8) Terry 
‘reasonable suspicion’ investigatory stops; and (9) searches incident to an arrest.  
Schraff v. State, 544 P.2d 834, 840–41 (Alaska 1975). 
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of a motor vehicle based on probable cause;27 (2) an inventory 
search;28 and (3) a Terry “reasonable suspicion” investigatory stop.29 
Because the expectation of privacy regarding one’s automobile 
is significantly less than that relating to one’s home or place of 
business, a less rigorous application of the Fourth Amendment 
governs.30  As a result, warrantless searches and seizures of 
automobiles have been upheld in circumstances where they would 
be illegal in a home or office.31  However, unfettered governmental 
intrusion into an automobile is impermissible.32  To protect against 
arbitrary stops, the Supreme Court requires that the 
reasonableness of a warrantless automobile stop be evaluated 
under an objective standard.33  Thus, “the decision to stop an 
automobile is reasonable where the police have probable cause to 
believe that a traffic violation has occurred.”34 
Warrantless automobile stops without probable cause are 
unconstitutional35 unless they are routine inventory searches or 
Terry investigatory stops.  In South Dakota v. Opperman,36 a 
vehicle illegally parked was towed to an impound lot.37  At the lot, 
the officers conducted a routine inventory of the contents within 
the car and found marijuana in the glove compartment.38  When the 
owner came by to reclaim his car, he was arrested for possession of 
illegal narcotics.39  Because of the less rigorous application of the 
Fourth Amendment to automobiles, the Court found that a routine 
inventory search to ensure safekeeping of the belongings within the 
car was reasonable.40  The Court held that since the inventory 
search of impounded vehicles was standard practice, the search was 
not a “pretext concealing an investigatory police motive.”41 
 
 27. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654, 662–63. 
 28. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 370–74 (1976). 
 29. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 148 (1972). 
 30. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 367. 
 31. Id. 
 32. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 663. 
 33. Id. at 654. 
 34. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 810 (1996) (internal citations 
omitted). 
 35. See Prouse, 440 U.S. at 662–63. 
 36. 428 U.S. 364 (1976). 
 37. Id. at 365–66. 
 38. Id. at 366. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 368, 375. 
 41. Id. at 376. 
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The final category of permissible automobile stops is the Terry 
“reasonable suspicion” investigatory stop.  In Terry v. Ohio,42 the 
Supreme Court upheld an officer’s investigatory search and seizure 
of an individual based on his “reasonable suspicion” that criminal 
conduct was likely to occur.43  Two men had caught the eye of the 
officer as they took turns walking down a street and peering into a 
store window roughly a dozen times.44  Suspecting the two were 
planning to rob the store, the officer stopped and questioned 
them.45  When asked their names the individuals “mumbled 
something,” at which point the officer decided to frisk them.46  The 
frisk revealed that the two individuals were carrying guns, and they 
were subsequently arrested for carrying concealed weapons.47 
The defendants challenged the admissibility of the evidence 
under the Fourth Amendment because the officer lacked probable 
cause for the warrantless search and seizure.48  To determine 
whether the officer’s intrusion was reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment, the Court applied an objective standard: “[W]ould 
the facts available to the officer at the moment of the seizure or the 
search ‘warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief’ that the 
action taken was appropriate?”49  An officer’s subjective good faith 
or “inarticulate hunches” were insufficient for an investigatory 
stop:50  “[I]n justifying the particular intrusion the police officer 
must be able to point to specific and articulable facts which, taken 
together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably 
warrant that intrusion.”51  Thus, investigatory stops based on 
reasonable suspicion and not on probable cause are permissible.52  
In Adams v. Williams,53 the Terry investigatory stop doctrine was 
extended to automobile stops.54 
 
 42. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 43. Id. at 30. 
 44. Id. at 6. 
 45. Id. at 6–7. 
 46. Id. at 7. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. at 7–8. 
 49. Id. at 21–22 (quoting Carroll v. United States, 267 U.S. 132, 162 (1925)). 
 50. See id. at 22. 
 51. Id. at 21. 
 52. Id. at 22. 
 53. 407 U.S. 143 (1972). 
 54. Id. at 148. 
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B. The Federal Pre-Whren Standard 
The only relevant Supreme Court case to mention pretexts 
before Whren was Abel v. United States.55  There, the FBI was 
interested in connecting Abel with espionage.56  Lacking sufficient 
evidence for such an arrest or search, the FBI notified the 
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) that Abel was an 
alien residing illegally in the United States.57  INS officers served 
the defendant with a warrant for his arrest.58  After the arrest, INS 
officers conducted a limited search of the premises.59  The FBI 
conducted a more thorough search later in the day, during which 
critical evidence of espionage was discovered.60  The defendant 
challenged the evidence gathered regarding espionage, claiming 
that the government used an administrative warrant as a pretext to 
search for evidence of espionage.61 
The Court acknowledged that it would not permit pretextual 
searches: “Were this claim justified by the record, it would indeed 
reveal a serious misconduct by law-enforcing officers.”62  The Court 
further stated that “[t]he test [for a pretext] is whether the decision 
to proceed administratively toward deportation was influenced by, 
and was carried out for, a purpose of amassing evidence in the 
prosecution for crime.”63  Because the INS officials acted in good 
faith in the deportation arrest, the Court did not find a pretext.64  
Furthermore, the proper communications, coordination, and 
procedures occurred between the FBI and the INS.65  Hence, Abel 
stood for the proposition that searches by law enforcement officers 
following standard procedures should not be considered pretexts.66 
 
 55. 362 U.S. 217 (1960).  Although the Supreme Court first mentioned 
pretexts in United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452 (1932), that case is no longer 
relevant since Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969) held that full warrantless 
searches of an arrestee’s premises are no longer permissible.  See LAFAVE, supra 
note 4, § 1.4(e). 
 56. Abel, 362 U.S. at 221. 
 57. Id. 
 58. Id. at 223. 
 59. Id. at 223–24. 
 60. Id. at 224–25. 
 61. Id. at 225. 
 62. Id. at 226. 
 63. Id. at 230. 
 64. Id. at 228. 
 65. Id. at 229. 
 66. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815–16 (1996); see also LAFAVE, 
supra note 4, § 1.4(e). 
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Abel left little guidance to the lower courts.67  As a result, 
lower courts looked to four other Fourth Amendment cases that 
addressed the subjective intent of law enforcement agents:68 Terry 
v. Ohio69 (discussed above), United States v. Robinson,70 Scott v. 
United States,71 and United States v. Villamonte-Marquez.72 
In Robinson, an officer knew that the defendant was driving 
without a license because the defendant was the subject of a 
previous investigation that took place four days earlier.73  The 
officer stopped and arrested the defendant.74  A search incident to 
the arrest revealed the defendant’s possession of heroin.75  
Discussing the defendant’s challenge to the stop, the Court stated 
in dicta that the officer’s subjective motive was not relevant 
because the arrest was lawful and the search was not a departure of 
established police practice.76 
Federal wiretapping laws require that federal agents minimize 
the interception of communications.77  In Scott, the defendant 
challenged the legality of a search because the government officials 
failed to make any effort to comply with the minimization 
requirements.78  The Court claimed that Fourth Amendment 
analysis first undertakes “an objective assessment of an officer’s 
actions in light of the facts and circumstances then known to him.”79  
In this case, the government agents’ actions were reasonable 
because they could not discriminate which phone calls to monitor 
until hearing the calls.80 
Finally, in Villamonte-Marquez, a congressional statute with 
historical roots to the First Congress was challenged for violating 
the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment.81  The 
statute permits customs officials to board any vessel in the United 
 
 67. See Kaban, supra note 6, at 1311. 
 68. See Whren, 517 U.S. at 812–13; United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 709 
(11th Cir. 1986); see also Kaban, supra note 6, at 1312. 
 69. 392 U.S. 1 (1968). 
 70. 414 U.S. 218 (1973). 
 71. 436 U.S. 128 (1978). 
 72. 462 U.S. 579 (1983). 
 73. 414 U.S. at 220. 
 74. Id. at 220–21. 
 75. Id. at 223. 
 76. Id. at 221 n.1. 
 77. Scott v. United States, 436 U.S. 128, 130 (1978). 
 78. Id. at 131–33. 
 79. Id. at 137. 
 80. Id. at 140. 
 81. United States v. Villamonte-Marquez, 462 U.S. 579, 585 (1983). 
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States at any time, without any suspicion of wrongdoing, for 
inspection of documents.82  Officers boarded a sailboat to inspect its 
documentation and soon smelled burning marijuana.83  A later 
search revealed 5800 pounds of marijuana.84  In response to the 
defendants’ challenge of the search and seizure, the Court stated in 
dicta that ulterior motives, like being tipped regarding narcotics 
trafficking, did not deprive agents of their legal justification of 
boarding the vessel for document inspection.85 
Based on these cases, ten circuits adopted an objective 
standard: if an officer could have legally made the stop, then it was 
not pretextual.86  The Ninth and Eleventh Circuits adopted a 
reasonable officer standard: whether a reasonable officer following 
normal police practice would have made the seizure in the absence 
of illegitimate motivation.87  The Tenth Circuit had also adopted 
the reasonable officer standard but later overruled it because “its 
application has been inconsistent and sporadic.”88  The court 
recognized that the reasonable officer standard deprived state 
legislators of “the task of determining what the traffic laws ought to 
be and how those laws ought to be enforced.”89  Holding the 
reasonable officer standard “unworkable,” the Tenth Circuit 
adopted the objective test.90 
C. The Objective Standard: Whren v. United States 
Two police officers in Washington, D.C., were patrolling a 
“high drug area” when they spotted a suspicious vehicle that they 
believed was carrying drugs.91  Although the officers lacked 
probable cause regarding narcotics transportation, they observed 
the truck turn without signaling and speed off.92  When the car 
stopped at a light, one of the officers approached it and 
 
 82. Id. at 580. 
 83. Id. at 583. 
 84. Id. 
 85. Id. at 584 n.3; see also Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812 (1996). 
 86. Kaban, supra note 6, at 1312. 
 87. United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 708 (11th Cir. 1986); United States v. 
Cannon, 29 F.3d 472, 476 (9th Cir. 1994).  The Eleventh Circuit did not answer 
whether the reasonable officer standard would apply to probable-cause traffic 
stops or only to investigatory stops. Smith, 799 F.2d at 708–09. 
 88. United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 786 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 89. Id. at 788. 
 90. Id. at 787. 
 91. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 808 (1996). 
 92. Id. 
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immediately spotted narcotics in the car.93  He arrested the two 
occupants.94  The defendants challenged the admissibility of the 
evidence because the officers had neither probable cause nor 
reasonable suspicion of illegal drug-dealing activity to make the 
stop.95 
Justice Scalia, writing for the unanimous court, claimed that 
“[n]ot only have we never held, outside the context of inventory 
search or administrative inspection . . . that an officer’s motive 
invalidates objectively justifiable behavior under the Fourth 
Amendment; but we have repeatedly held and asserted the 
contrary.”96  Subjective motivations do not factor into the probable 
cause Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis.97  Thus, 
pretextual searches and seizures are valid where there is probable 
cause to make the initial stop.98  The Court recognized the concern 
that pretexts may generate selective law enforcement but claimed 
that selective law enforcement is illegal under the Equal Protection 
Clause and not the Fourth Amendment.99 
In Whren, the Court finally addressed the issue of pretextual 
searches and seizures for probable-cause automobile stops.  
However, the Court has yet to address the pretext issue as it relates 
to investigatory stops.100 
D. The Subjective Standard: State v. Ladson101 
Most states incorporate some sort of search-and-seizure 
protection within their state constitutions.102  In many cases these 
provisions are similar, if not identical, to the Fourth Amendment.103  
In a few cases, the language is different.104  Although states can 
interpret provisions in their constitutions more broadly than similar 
 
 93. Id. at 809–10. 
 94. Id. at 809. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. at 812. 
 97. Id. at 813. 
 98. Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See LAFAVE, supra note 4, § 1.4(f). 
 101. 979 P.2d 833 (Wash. 1999). 
 102. See, e.g., FLA. CONST. art. I, § 12; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 18; N.H. CONST. art. 
I, § 19; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 20; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 6; 
WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 6. 
 103. See, e.g., N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12; W. VA. CONST. art. III, § 6; FLA. CONST. 
art. I, § 12. 
 104. See, e.g., WASH. CONST. art. I, § 7; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 20. 
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provisions under the Federal Constitution,105 almost all the states 
have adopted the Whren objective standard for pretexts.106  The 
State of Washington is a notable exception.107 
The Washington Supreme Court adopted the subjective intent 
standard in State v. Ladson.108  In Ladson, two police officers tailed 
Richard Fogle’s car because Fogle was rumored to be involved in 
drug dealing.109  The officers stopped Fogle for recently expired 
license plate tags and later found that his driver’s license was 
suspended.110  After arresting Fogle, the officers turned their 
attention to Thomas Ladson, the passenger.111  The police searched 
Ladson and his jacket, which was left inside the car, and they 
discovered a concealed weapon.112  The police arrested the 
defendant and conducted a more thorough search, which revealed 
marijuana.113  The defendant challenged the legality of the search 
and seizure because the stop was pretextual, a characterization the 
police did not deny at trial.114 
The search-and-seizure provision in the Washington 
Constitution places a greater emphasis on privacy than does the 
U.S. Constitution.115  The Ladson court held that all searches 
require a warrant unless they fall within a narrow category of 
exceptions.116  The court explained that “the reasonable articulable 
suspicion that a traffic infraction has occurred which justifies an 
exception to the warrant requirement for an ordinary traffic stop 
does not justify a stop for criminal investigation.”117  The court held 
that the actual reason for the stop must function as something more 
than a mere formal justification for the search.118  Therefore, a 
 
 105. See, e.g., Roberts v. State, 458 P.2d 340, 342 (Alaska 1969); State v. 
Gunwall, 720 P.2d 808 (Wash. 1986).  But see Holland v. State, 696 So. 2d 757, 759 
(Fla. 1997) (holding that a conformity clause within the Florida Constitution 
requires that search-and-seizure laws be identical to U.S. Supreme Court 
holdings). 
 106. See People v. Robinson, 767 N.E.2d 638 (N.Y. 2001) (providing a thorough 
review of pretexts in the fifty states). 
 107. See id. at 642 n.1. 
 108. State v. Ladson, 979 P.2d 833, 842–43 (Wash. 1999). 
 109. Id. at 836. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. 
 115. Id. at 837. 
 116. Id. at 838. 
 117. Id. at 837–38. 
 118. See id. at 838–39. 
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search or seizure may not expand beyond the rationale for the 
exception,119 and thus pretextual searches and seizures violate the 
Washington Constitution.120 
III.  SEARCH-AND-SEIZURE IN ALASKA 
A. General Search-and-Seizure Laws 
The Alaska Constitution provides protection from 
unreasonable searches and seizures: 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses and 
other property, papers, and effects, against unreasonable 
searches and seizures, shall not be violated.  No warrants shall 
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized.121 
In Anchorage Police Department Employees Ass’n v. 
Municipality of Anchorage,122 the Supreme Court of Alaska held 
that protection under this state constitutional provision “is stronger 
than the federal protection because article I, section 14 [of the 
Alaska Constitution] is textually broader than the Fourth 
Amendment and the clause draws added strength from Alaska’s 
express guarantee of privacy.”123  This broader protection 
encompases protections provided under the Privacy Provision of 
article I, section 22.124  The Anchorage Police court held that 
constitutional concerns regarding unwarranted intrusion should be 
addressed by solely focusing on section 14’s search-and-seizure 
protections and stated that “in cases involving allegedly invalid 
searches, we have recognized that the standard for determining 
compliance with Alaska’s search-and-seizure clause is ‘inexorably 
entwined’ with the standard of privacy established in article I, 
section 22.”125  Nonetheless, the greater privacy protection under 
article I, section 14 has been used to challenge legal principles held 
valid under the Fourth Amendment.  For example, Alaska affords 
 
 119. Id. at 842. 
 120. Id. at 836. 
 121. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 14. 
 122. 24 P.3d 547 (Alaska 2001) (citations omitted). 
 123. Id. at 550.  The only textual difference between the Fourth Amendment 
and article I, section 14 of the Alaska Constitution is the phrase “and other 
property.”  See id. 
 124. ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22. 
 125. Anchorage Police Dep’t Employees Ass’n, 24 P.3d at 550–51. 
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greater search-and-seizure protection for automobiles under its 
state constitution.126 
Alaska also recognizes the federal exceptions to the warrant 
requirement127 but places greater restrictions on the warrant 
exceptions.  Hence, Alaska recognizes, with significant restrictions, 
the three categories of warrantless automobile stops: (1) a search of 
a motor vehicle based on probable cause; (2) an investigatory stop; 
and (3) an inventory search. 
A warrantless search or seizure is lawful where the police have 
“probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed and 
probable cause to believe that the person committed it.”128  Alaska 
courts have explained that “[p]robable cause exists where ‘the facts 
and circumstances within their (the officers’) knowledge, and of 
which they had reasonably trustworthy information, (are) sufficient 
in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution in the belief 
that’ an offense has been or is being committed.”129 
Investigatory stops of automobiles based on suspicious 
circumstances are also permissible.130  The principal justification for 
such stops is that police officers have a duty to make prompt 
investigations of practical necessity.131  However, since these stops 
lack probable cause, they are only permissible within a narrow 
range of circumstances: (1) where the police officer has reasonable 
suspicion that imminent public danger exists;132 (2) where serious 
harm to person or property has recently occurred;133 or (3) where 
an officer stops a potential witness near the scene of a recently 
reported serious crime.134  In addition, an officer must point to 
specific and articulable facts that, taken together with rational 
inferences, reasonably warrant the investigatory stop.135 
 
 126. See State v. Daniel, 589 P.2d 408, 416 (Alaska 1979).  Contra South 
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 367 (1976). 
 127. See Schraff v. State, 544 P.3d 834, 840–41, 844–45 (Alaska 1975) (holding 
that an officer’s search of a suspect’s car and wallet was not one of nine recognized 
exceptions to the warrant requirement). 
 128. McCoy v. State, 491 P.2d 127, 129 (Alaska 1971). 
 129. Id. (quoting Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175–176 (1949) 
(alteration and parenthesis in original). 
 130. Coleman v. State, 553 P.2d 40, 46–47 (Alaska 1976) 
 131. Goss v. State, 390 P.2d 220, 224 (Alaska 1964); Metzker v. State, 797 P.2d 
1219, 1221 (Alaska Ct. App. 1990). 
 132. Coleman, 553 P.2d at 46; Metzker, 797 P.2d at 1220. 
 133. Coleman, 553 P.2d at 46; Metzker, 797 P.2d at 1220. 
 134. Metzker, 797 P.2d at 1221; Beauvois v. State, 837 P.2d 1118, 1121 (Alaska 
Ct. App. 1992). 
 135. Coleman, 553 P.2d at 45 (adopting the test in Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–
22 (1968)). 
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Finally, inventory searches are permissible, but Alaska law 
substantially restricts these searches and seizures.136  The only case 
to address inventory searches of automobiles was State v. Daniel.137  
In Daniel, an officer conducted an inventory of an impounded car 
and opened a briefcase that was left in the backseat.138  Inside the 
briefcase, the officer found marijuana and an automatic pistol and 
charged the defendant accordingly.139  The court held that purely 
routine, non-investigatory inventory searches for the purpose of 
protecting property located within an impounded vehicle are 
permissible; however opening closed, sealed, or locked containers 
during such a search violates the protections of the Alaska 
Constitution.140 
The Alaska courts have been equally restrictive in the context 
of other inventory searches.  In Zehrung v. State,141 an inventory 
search during a booking revealed that the defendant carried in his 
wallet two stolen credits cards belonging to rape victims.142  Since 
the defendant had already posted bail and was not going to be 
incarcerated, the court held that the jailhouse inventory search was, 
absent probable cause, an unreasonable governmental intrusion 
into the defendant’s personal freedom.143  In Reeves v. State,144 
police performing a routine booking inventory search at a state jail 
annex discovered a balloon containing an unknown substance.145  
The officers unwrapped the balloon, and one of the officers took its 
contents to a police station where field testing revealed the 
presence of heroin.146  The court found that, even after an 
individual’s arrest, privacy interests extend even to items within 
closed or sealed containers, which cannot be opened for inventory 
searches without a warrant, consent, or prior probable cause.147 
 
 136. See Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727, 737 (Alaska 1979) (holding that a pre-
incarceration inventory search “should be no more intensive than reasonably 
necessary . . . .”). 
 137. 589 P.2d 408 (Alaska 1979). 
 138. Id. at 410. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. at 417–18. 
 141. 569 P.2d 189 (Alaska 1977). 
 142. Id. at 191–92. 
 143. Id. at 193. 
 144. 599 P.2d 727 (Alaska 1979). 
 145. Id. at 730. 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 737–38. 
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B. Relevant Pretext Case Law 
Before Whren, the Alaska Supreme Court addressed pretexts 
only in the context of the Fourth Amendment.  The first pretextual 
search-and-seizure case was McCoy v. State.148  In McCoy, a ticket 
on Western Airlines had been purchased with a stolen credit 
card.149  The defendant presented this ticket to the airlines at the 
Anchorage airport and was arrested.150  At the police station, the 
police searched the defendant without a warrant, and the search 
discovered a package of cocaine.151  The defendant moved to 
suppress the narcotics evidence on the ground that the seach and 
seizure was unlawful.152  In its Fourth Amendment analysis, the 
court stated that, although an arrest cannot serve as a mere pretext 
for a search, a warrant is not required for a search wholly incident 
to a vaild arrest.153  The court went on to hold that the Alaska 
Constitution did not require broader search-and-seizure protection 
than the Fourth Amendment already required.154  The court stated 
that “[w]here there is probable cause to arrest for a particular 
crime of a type which can be evidenced by items concealed on the 
person there is little danger of a pretext arrest.”155  Further, the 
court relied on policy in determining that “to require a warrant in 
the circumstances of this case would be a futile gesture which could 
hamstring legitimate police action without offering meaningful 
protection to the arrestee.”156 
Justice Rabinowitz strongly dissented from the majority 
opinion, arguing for greater protection under the Alaska 
Constitution.157  He contended that warrantless searches are limited 
by the reason for the exception: “I read Alaska’s Constitution as 
requiring that the intensity of all warrantless searches of the person 
be limited by the necessity, or exigency, which provides the basis 
for the exception.”158  Thus searches should not be permissible 
when the “rationale for the warrantless intrusion no longer 
exists.”159  He encouraged his colleagues to establish “a rule that the 
 
 148. 491 P.2d 127 (Alaska 1971). 
 149. Id. at 128. 
 150. Id. 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 138. 
 154. Id. at 139. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. at 138. 
 157. Id. at 142–43 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting). 
 158. Id. at 142. 
 159. Id. 
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intensity of a warrantless search should be limited to the purpose 
which justifies its exception.”160  However, the court refused to 
adopt Justice Rabinowitz’s position.161 
Four years later, in Schraff v. State,162 the Alaska Supreme 
Court again warned against pretextual searches under the Fourth 
Amendment.163  Yet, the court refused to accept Justice 
Rabinowitz’s legal opinion that the warrant exceptions’ rationale 
“provide[s] the theoretical and practical justification for departure 
from the constitutional requirement [of a warrant] . . . [and 
therefore] these same justifications provide relevant criteria for 
delineation of the permissible degree of intensity of a warrantless 
search of the person incident to a lawful arrest.”164 
In two cases in 1978, the Alaska Supreme Court rejected 
arguments that searches were impermissible pretexts where the 
facts supported a valid basis for the search.165  In one of those cases, 
Brown v. State, an officer responding to an armed robbery 
witnessed a speeding vehicle traveling in the opposite direction.166  
The vehicle failed to signal when making a left turn and did not 
stop at a stop sign.167  The officer stopped the vehicle for traffic 
violations, and the defendant, who matched the suspect’s 
description, bolted from his car and was apprehended by the 
officer.168  The defendant moved to suppress the evidence found 
within his car because he claimed the traffic stop was a pretext, 
although the facts never mentioned anything regarding the officer’s 
subjective intent.169  Nevertheless, the court found that “there was 
substantial evidence to support the trial court’s determination that 
Brown’s vehicle was stopped for a violation of traffic regulations, 
and that this was not a pretext stop.”170 
 
 160. Id. at 143. 
 161. Id. at 133, 139 (majority opinion expressing disagreement with their 
dissenting justices and refusing to apply a broader protection under the Alaska 
Constitution).   
 162. 544 P.2d 834 (Alaska 1975). 
 163. See id. at 842. 
 164. Id. at 849 (Rabinowitz, J., dissenting). 
 165. Clark v. State, 574 P.2d 1261, 1265 (Alaska 1978); Brown v. State, 580 P.2d 
1174, 1176 (Alaska 1978) (per curiam). 
 166. Brown, 580 P.2d at 1175. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. 
 169. Id. at 1176. 
 170. Id. 
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The Alaska Court of Appeals addressed the pretext issue in 
Townsel v. State.171  In Townsel, an officer responding to an armed 
robbery witnessed a vehicle traveling in the opposite direction and 
in violation of numerous traffic regulations: the driver was 
speeding and the vehicle had a broken headlight, a broken taillight, 
an obscured driver’s window, and an obscured license plate.172  The 
officer stopped the car and asked the defendant to exit the 
vehicle.173  When the defendant reached for his rifle in the backseat, 
the officer drew his own weapon, and the defendant fled on foot.174  
Since the officer was unable to catch the defendant, the police 
searched the contents of the car, found a driver’s license, obtained 
a search warrant for the defendant’s residence, and arrested the 
defendant.175  At trial, the defendant claimed that the stop was an 
invalid pretextual stop.176  The court found that because the officer 
indicated that he would have made the traffic stop regardless of his 
investigation of the robbery, the stop was not a pretext.177 
The last case before Whren to address the subjective intent of 
a police officer was Beauvois v. State.178  In Beauvois, the defendant 
robbed a 7-Eleven and fled on foot towards a campground.179  Once 
there, the defendant entered his friend’s car, and they started 
driving out of the campground.180  Because there was only one road 
out and it was 3:00 a.m., an officer responding to the robbery, 
believing that anyone awake in the area could reasonably be a 
potential witness, decided to stop all moving vehicles he 
encountered.181  After the officer stopped the car carrying the 
defendant, one of the passengers jumped out.182  The officer soon 
learned that the car was stolen and detained the driver.183  Finally, 
the officer noticed someone hiding under a blanket in the 
backseat.184  He removed the blanket and discovered the defendant, 
 
 171. 763 P.2d 1353 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988). 
 172. Id. at 1354. 
 173. Id. at 1355. 
 174. Id. 
 175. Id. 
 176. Id. at 1354. 
 177. Id. at 1355. 
 178. 837 P.2d 1118 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992). 
 179. Id. at 1119–20. 
 180. Id. at 1120. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id. 
 183. Id. 
 184. Id. 
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who matched the robber’s description.185  The 7-Eleven clerk 
arrived at the scene and identified the defendant as the robber.186  
Charged with robbery, the defendant argued at trial that the stop 
was an illegal seizure, but he did not specifically argue that it was 
an illegal pretext.187 
The court found that the stop was a legal investigatory stop 
since officers are permitted to reasonably stop potential witnesses 
near the scene of a recently reported crime.188  In dicta, the court 
stated that “[the officer’s] subjective intent when he stopped the 
car is irrelevant. The test is whether, under the facts known to the 
police officer, the stop of the car was objectively justified. . . . ‘This 
test . . . is purely objective and thus there is no requirement that an 
actual suspicion by the officer be shown.’”189  However, this holding 
does not demonstrate adoption of the objective test for pretexts, 
but rather only for Terry investigatory stops.190  The latter objective 
test was meant to protect individuals from detention based solely 
on an officer’s “inarticulate hunches,”191 thereby precluding the 
good-faith exception rule for investigatory stops.  Thus, in 
Beauvois, the court was neither addressing the pretext issue nor 
establishing the irrelevance of an officer’s “bad faith” subjective 
intent for an investigatory stop. 
C. Six Recent Cases: Hamilton, Way, Nease, and Others 
Since Whren was decided, six cases have addressed the 
constitutionality of pretextual searches and seizures under the 
Alaska Constitution.  However, in all six cases, the Alaska Court of 
Appeals has avoided addressing the pretext issue under the state 
constitution.  In addition, in Hamilton v. State and Way v. State the 
court applied the Whren objective standard.192  A year later, 
however, in Nease v. State, the court applied the reasonable officer 
standard.193  Although the reasonable officer standard seems to 
have prevailed, the court still has failed to conduct a thorough 
analysis of the pretext issue under the Alaska Constitution. 
 
 185. Id. 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Id. at 1121. 
 189. Id., n.1 (quoting 3 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 9.3(a) (2d 
ed. 1987)) (emphasis in original). 
 190. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968). 
 191. See id. 
 192. Hamilton v. State, 59 P.3d 760, 764–65 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002); Way v. 
State, 100 P.3d 902, 904 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004). 
 193. Nease v. State, 105 P.3d 1145, 1149 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005). 
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In Hamilton, the defendant entered a victim’s home in the 
middle of the night and stabbed him twenty-eight times.194  An 
officer arriving at the scene of the crime witnessed two cars 
traveling away.195  Since it was approximately 2:30 a.m., the officer 
wanted to record the license plate number of one of the cars for 
later questioning to determine if the driver was a potential witness 
to the crime.196  The officer radioed for a police car behind him to 
record the license plate number of the sedan.197  However, the 
license plate was obscured by snow in violation of Alaska traffic 
law.198  The officer stopped the car to talk to the driver.199  Upon 
reaching the driver’s window, the officer noticed that the driver’s 
hands were covered in blood.200  The officer then arrested him and 
a subsequent search of the car revealed evidence linking the 
defendant to the murder.201  The defendant challenged the legality 
of the stop.202 
In the first part of its analysis, the court found that the officer 
had probable cause to stop Hamilton because of his traffic 
violation.203  The court then relied on Beauvois in its analysis of the 
legality of the stop, stating that an investigatory stop “hinges on an 
objective test . . . . The officers’ subjective theories as to why the 
stop was proper are irrelevant.”204  The court expanded upon this 
rule by stating that “the legality of the traffic stop [not just an 
investigatory stop] is determined by an objective assessment of the 
facts known to the officers at the time they conducted the stop.”205  
Finally, the court concluded that it did not need to accept or reject 
Whren as a matter of Alaska constitutional law because “the police 
were justified in stopping Hamilton’s car as part of their 
investigation.”206  In the second part of the analysis, the court found 
that the stop was a permissible investigatory stop for the purpose of 
 
 194. Hamilton, 59 P.3d at 762–63. 
 195. Id. at 763. 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 764. 
 199. Id. 
 200. Id. 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. at 762. 
 203. Id. at 765. 
 204. Id. 
 205. Id. 
 206. Id. at 766. 
02__DESAI.DOC 1/10/2007  8:47 AM 
254 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [23:235 
questioning potential witnesses near the scene of a recently 
committed serious crime.207 
In Way v. State, an informant had tipped officers that the 
defendant’s van contained a methamphetamine lab.208  Upon seeing 
a similar van drive by, an officer tried to see the van’s license plate, 
but the plate was obscured.209  The officer radioed for another 
trooper to stop the van for the license plate violation and to 
determine if the van belonged to Way.210  Upon approaching the 
van, the police smelled iodine and saw a small bag of white 
powder.211  After getting a search warrant, the officers searched the 
vehicle.212  The defendant claimed that the stop was illegal because 
it was a pretext to determine whether the van had a 
methamphetamine lab.213 
The court determined that it need not adopt either Whren or 
Ladson as a matter of Alaska constitutional law because the stop 
was not pretextual.214  It held that the officers had probable cause to 
stop the vehicle for illegal license plates.215  Furthermore, in 
defining the pretext standard, the court provided a very narrow 
example of a pretextual search, describing a scenario in which 
police follow a suspect and wait until the suspect commits a traffic 
violation.216 
Recently, the court addressed pretextual stops in Nease v. 
State.  In Nease, a police officer saw a red pickup truck speeding at 
seventy-five miles per hour in snowy conditions.217  When the 
officer caught up to the truck, the truck was parked, and its owner, 
Nease, who could barely walk due to intoxication, claimed that he 
had not been driving.218  The officer then warned Nease that the 
next time Nease drove drunk, the officer was going to catch him.219  
 
 207. Id. at 767. 
 208. Way v. State, 100 P.3d 902, 903 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004). 
 209. Id. 
 210. Id. 
 211. Id. 
 212. Id. 
 213. Id. 
 214. Id. at 904. 
 215. Id. at 904–05. 
 216. Id. at 905 (“[T]he classic pretext search is one where the police follow a 
suspect based on the theory . . . that the suspect will certainly commit a traffic 
violation within a short period of time which will give the police the opportunity 
to stop the suspect for the traffic violation and then search the suspect and the 
vehicle.”). 
 217. Nease v. State, 105 P.3d 1145, 1146 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005). 
 218. Id. 
 219. Id. 
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Some days later, the officer noticed the truck parked at a local 
bar.220  An hour later, the officer noticed the truck again at a local 
restaurant.221  When Nease pulled out of the parking lot, the officer 
followed, suspecting that Nease was driving while intoxicated.222  
The officer at first noticed no problems with Nease’s driving, but 
when he noticed that one of Nease’s brake lights did not work, he 
pulled Nease over.223  The officer then determined that Nease was 
intoxicated and arrested him.224  The defendant challenged the 
validity of the traffic stop, arguing that it was used as a pretext to 
determine if he had been driving while intoxicated.225  The district 
court agreed.226 
The Alaska Court of Appeals, however, held that the stop was 
legal.227  It found that the officer had probable cause to stop Nease 
for violation of a minor traffic regulation.228  The court further 
determined that it need not address if the Whren or Ladson 
standards applied under the Alaska Constitution because the stop 
did not fall within the pretext doctrine, as defined under the Fourth 
Amendment.229  In reaching its conclusion, the court cited LaFave’s 
Search and Seizure, stating that “the fact that a police officer may 
have an ulterior motive for enforcing the law is irrelevant for 
Fourth Amendment purposes—even under the doctrine of pretext 
searches—unless the defendant proves that this ulterior motive 
prompted the officer to depart from reasonable police practices.”230  
Furthermore, “[e]ven if [the court] were to subscribe to the 
doctrine of ‘pretext stops,’ the question would be whether Nease 
proved that Officer Torok departed from reasonable police 
practice when he decided to stop Nease because of the non-
functioning brake light.”231  The court concluded that the officer 
had probable cause for the stop and that the stop was not a 
departure from reasonable police practice; therefore, the stop was 
legal.232 
 
 220. Id. 
 221. Id. 
 222. Id. 
 223. Id. at 1147. 
 224. Id. 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. 
 227. Id. at 1150. 
 228. Id. at 1148. 
 229. Id. 
 230. Id. (emphasis added) (citation omitted). 
 231. Id. at 1149. 
 232. Id. at 1150. 
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Since Nease, the court of appeals has addressed three cases 
that raised pretext claims under the Alaska Constitution: Olson v. 
State,233 Grohs v. State,234 and Marley v. State.235  Each of these cases 
only further supported and substantiated the Nease decision.  The 
court ruled that to have a valid pretext claim under the Fourth 
Amendment, the defendants must show both that an ulterior 
motive existed and that departure from reasonable police practice 
was prompted by that motive.236 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
A. The Alaska Court of Appeals’ Failure to Address the Issue of 
Pretexts Under the Alaska Constitution 
Before Whren, Alaska courts had inoccuously avoided 
addressing the pretext issue in both Brown and Townsel in that, in 
those cases, the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to 
establish that the officer did not act with improper motivation.237  
Thus, the courts’ refusal to overturn the lower courts’ findings was 
not erroneous.238  Likewise, Hamilton provided a poor opportunity 
to address the pretext question because the officer had no 
improper motive239—the stop was a valid investigatory stop.240  The 
subjective motivation of the officer was to make a stop for the 
purpose of questioning potential witnesses about a serious crime 
recently committed nearby.241  Thus, the officer had no illegal 
motivation. 
 However, starting with Way, the court of appeals has 
erroneously avoided the pretext question under the Alaska 
Constitution.  In Way, the court narrowly redefined pretexts to 
include only those cases where the police follow a suspect and wait 
until he commits a traffic violation.242  No prior decisions have 
defined pretexts so narrowly.  As defined earlier, a pretextual 
search or seizure occurs when the police use a legal justification to 
 
 233. No. A-8595, 2005 Alas. App. LEXIS 69 (Alaska Ct. App. July 20, 2005). 
 234. 118 P.3d 1080 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005). 
 235. No. A-9285, 2006 Alas. App. LEXIS 80 (Alaska Ct. App. May 3, 2006). 
 236. Olson, 2005 Alas. App. LEXIS 69, at *7–8; Grohs, 118 P.3d at 1082; 
Marley, 2006 Alas. App. LEXIS 80, at *11. 
 237. See Brown v. State, 580 P.2d 1174, 1176 (Alaska 1978); Townsel v. State, 
763 P.2d 1353, 1355 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988). 
 238. See Brown, 580 P.2d at 1176; Townsel, 763 P.2d at 1355. 
 239. See Hamilton v. State, 59 P.3d 760, 766 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002). 
 240. Id. at 767. 
 241. See id. at 766. 
 242. See Way v. State, 100 P.3d 902, 905 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004). 
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make a stop in order to conduct a search for an unrelated crime for 
which they do not have the probable cause or the reasonable 
suspicion necessary to support a stop.243  Rather than focusing on: 
(1) whether the officer had probable cause to stop Way for an 
investigation of a possible methamphetamine lab or (2) whether 
the officer’s subjective intent was to search Way’s van for a lab, the 
court redefined pretexts to avoid addressing the question.244 
In Nease, the court of appeals committed an even greater error 
in finding that the case did not factually fall within the doctrine of 
pretextual stops.245  The facts of the case fell squarely within the 
definition of pretexts that the court developed a year earlier in 
Way.  Nonetheless, the court provided no justification for why the 
pretext definition in Way was not applicable.  In addition, the court 
failed to provide adequate justification for its dismissal of the 
pretext question under state law.246  The court claimed that the facts 
failed to fall within the pretext doctrine, as defined under federal 
law, and did not address the question under the Alaska 
Constitution.247 
In conclusion, the Alaska Court of Appeals should no longer 
avoid the pretext issue under the state’s constitution.  The focus 
should be whether an officer had an ulterior motive for the stop.  If 
an ulterior motive exists, the court should do a thorough analysis of 
the pretext doctrine under the Alaska Constitution. 
B. The Implicit Adoption of the Reasonable Officer Standard by 
the Alaska Court of Appeals 
The current Alaska law regarding pretexts is based on 
improper analyses.  In Beauvois, the court, in dicta, misinterpreted 
Terry and stated that an objective standard prevails in investigatory 
stops.248  In Terry, the Supreme Court adopted an objective test 
solely as a means to protect individuals from police harassment by 
requiring some objective rationale for the stop.249  The Court 
indicated that an officer’s subjective “good faith” alone would not 
warrant these intrusions, thereby excluding Terry stops from the 
good-faith exception to illegal searches and seizures.250  In fact, the 
 
 243. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 244. See Way, 100 P.3d at 905. 
 245. Nease v. State, 105 P.3d 1145, 1148–49 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005). 
 246. Id. at 1148. 
 247. Id. at 1148–50. 
 248. Beauvois v. State, 837 P.2d 1118, 1121–22 n.1 (Alaska Ct. App. 1992); see 
also supra notes 188–91 and accompanying text. 
 249. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21–22 (1968). 
 250. See id. 
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U.S. Supreme Court has never addressed whether “bad faith” 
subjective motivation is permissible for investigatory stops.251  
Although the Beauvois court was neither addressing the issue of 
pretext nor establishing precedent, this misinterpretation has been 
relied upon in later cases. 
For example, in Hamilton and Way, the Alaska Court of 
Appeals appears to have adopted the objectective standard by 
default and without applying the appropriate analysis under the 
Alaska Constiutiton.  In Hamilton, the court of appeals directly 
relied on Beauvois.252  The court held that Beauvois announced the 
position that the legality of an investigatory stop relies on an 
objective test and that the subjective intent of the officer plays no 
role.253  The court then applied the objective test to probable-cause 
stops.254  Although investigatory stops and probable-cause stops 
have been considered separate categories of warrantless 
exceptions, the Hamilton court conflated these constitutionally 
protected categories without providing any justification.255  As such, 
the Hamilton court implicitly applied the Whren standard when it 
held that the officer’s subjective intent plays no role in probable-
cause traffic stops.256  In Way, the court reconfirmed, implicitly, the 
adoption of the Whren standard.257 
In Nease, the court of appeals erroneously adopted the 
reasonable officer standard through an improper analysis of federal 
law.  Although the pretext issue was dismissed, the court 
investigated which standard would be appropriate had the pretext 
issue been addressed.258  In determining which standard would 
prevail for pretextual stops, the court did not rely on either Whren 
or Ladson, but turned to LaFave’s Search and Seizure treatise.259  
However, instead of using the 2004 version of that treatise, the 
court used the 1996 version, which was published before the Whren 
decision.260  The court cited the sections of LaFave that refer to the 
 
 251. LAFAVE, supra note 4, § 1.4(f). 
 252. Hamilton v. State, 59 P.3d 760, 765 (Alaska Ct. App. 2002). 
 253. Id. 
 254. See id. 
 255. See id. 
 256. See id. 
 257. See Way v. State, 100 P.3d 902, 904–05 (Alaska Ct. App. 2004). 
 258. See Nease v. State, 105 P.3d 1145, 1148–49 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005). 
 259. Id. 
 260. See id. at 1148 n.16; compare 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE,  SEARCH AND 
SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 1.4(e) (3d ed. 1996) 
(predating Whren), with LAFAVE, supra note 4, § 1.4(f) (reflecting the Whren 
standard.) 
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United States Supreme Court opinions of Abel, Scott, and other 
pre-Whren cases.261  In fact, the Nease court relied on LaFave’s 
discussion of Abel to determine that pretextual searches and 
seizures do not occur where there is no departure from reasonable 
police practice.262  Since Whren has definitively addressed this issue 
and rejected the reasonable officer standard,263 the focus on Abel’s 
potential application is misplaced.  Nonetheless, like the Ninth, 
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have in the past, the court of appeals 
implicitly adopted the reasonable officer standard.264  
Unfortunately, Olson,265 Grohs,266 and Marley267 served only to 
reconfirm the Nease decision. 
In conclusion, the current applicable law on the pretext 
doctrine in Alaska has been developed by improper legal analysis.  
In the post-Whren era, the court indirectly adopted the objective 
standard, but, during the last two years, it has established a 
reasonable officer standard.  The courts should discard this 
improper standard and finally address the pretext doctrine with a 
thorough and proper analysis under the Alaska Constitution. 
C. Pretext Analysis Under the Alaska Constitution 
Alaska courts have investigated the pretext question under the 
Fourth Amendment but have not determined whether Alaska’s 
state constitution requires a different standard.268  Because this issue 
has been raised and is of great significance, the Alaska courts 
should determine the validity of pretexts under article I, section 14 
of the Alaska Constitution. 
When the Alaska courts do address this issue, they should 
conduct their own thorough analysis under the Alaska Constitution 
and not simply adopt the federal standard as there are significant 
differences between Alaska’s search-and-seizure laws and those of 
the federal government.  First, article I, section 14 provides broader 
 
 261. See Nease, 105 P.3d at 1148–49; LAFAVE, supra note 260, § 1.4(e). 
 262. Nease, 105 P.3d at 1148–49; see also LAFAVE, supra note 260, § 1.4(e). 
 263. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 814 (1996). 
 264. See Nease, 105 P.3d at 1149. 
 265. See Olson v. State, No. A-8595, 2005 Alas. App. LEXIS 69, at *7–8 
(Alaska Ct. App. July 20, 2005). 
 266. See Grohs v. State, 118 P.3d 1080, 1081–82 (Alaska Ct. App. 2005). 
 267. See Marley v. State, No. A-9285, 2006 Alas. App. LEXIS 80, at *11 
(Alaska Ct. App. May 3, 2006). 
 268. See Brown v. State, 580 P.2d 1174, 1176 (Alaska 1978); Clark v. State, 574 
P.2d 1261, 1265 (Alaska 1978); McCoy v. State, 491 P.2d 127, 138 (Alaska 1971); 
Townsel v. State, 763 P.2d 1353, 1355 (Alaska Ct. App. 1988). 
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protection than do the guarantees of the Fourth Amendment.269  
Second, article I, section 14 specifically provides a higher degree of 
privacy protection within one’s car.270  For example, in South 
Dakota v. Opperman, the Supreme Court held that the lower 
expectation of privacy within one’s vehicle permits broad inventory 
searches.271  The Alaska Supreme Court came to a different 
conclusion, allowing only minimal inventory searches of vehicles.272  
Finally, the warrant exceptions in Alaska are more restrictive.273  
Thus, the Alaska courts should do a thorough analysis of pretextual 
search-and-seizure law under the Alaska Constitution. 
In Whren, the Supreme Court recognized the prevalence of 
objective factors in a Fourth Amendment analysis.274  The adoption 
of the objective standard for pretexts was a natural extension of its 
prior holdings.275  Likewise, any analysis of pretexts under the 
Alaska Constitution should rely on anaolgous authority from other 
search-and-seizure contexts. 
Although the Alaska Constitution provides broader privacy 
protection than does the Fourth Amendment,276 it does not 
necessitate the illegality of pretext stops.  The broader privacy 
protection under the Alaska Constitution is not unlimited: “In such 
circumstances [where there is little danger of a pretext] the 
individual’s right of privacy must give way to the public need to 
investigate the crime.”277  As a result, in warrantless search-and-
seizure cases, the broader privacy protection has applied greater 
 
 269. Anchorage Police Dep’t Employees Ass’n v. Municipality of Anchorage, 
24 P.3d 547, 550 (Alaska 2001). 
 270. See State v. Daniel, 589 P.2d 408, 416 (Alaska 1979) (holding that search of 
closed containers within a car is not permitted in an inventory search due to the 
individual’s privacy expectation). But see United States v. Chadwick, 433 U.S. 1 
(1977) (prohibiting searches of closed containers in a car during a search after 
arrest, but not an inventory search), overruled by California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 
565 (1991). Contra New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981) (permitting searches 
of closed containers in an immediate post-arrest search). 
 271. 428 U.S. 364, 367–68 (1976). 
 272. See Daniel, 589 P.2d at 416–17. 
 273. See supra Part III.A. 
 274. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 812–13 (1996). 
 275. Id. 
 276. Anchorage Police Dep’t Employees Ass’n v. Municipality of Anchorage, 
24 P.3d 547, 550 (Alaska 2001). 
 277. McCoy v. State, 491 P.2d 127, 139 (Alaska 1971). 
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restrictions in two circumstances: in limiting the scope of a search 
or seizure and in narrowly construing warrant exceptions.278   
Pretexts deal with neither category.  First, a pretext is defined 
in terms of the subjective motivation for the search and not the 
scope of that search.  For example, an officer acting on an 
impermissible subjective motivation for a search must still conform 
to the standard scope of that search unless probable cause arises 
that permits a broader scope.279  Second, pretexts do not implicate 
any warrant exception other than that which justified the initial 
stop.  The objective validity of a pretext under the initial warrant 
exception is not at issue, rather the subjective motivation is what 
makes pretexts problematic.   
Alaska courts have, however, interpreted the Alaska 
Constitution as it applies in other seach-and-seizure contexts, and 
have tended to shy away from subjective standards.  Warrant 
exceptions, for example, under both Alaska and federal law, are 
based on generally-applicable, objective policy rationales.  For 
example, as discussed earlier, a Terry investigatory stop is 
permissible, without a warrant, in order to ensure public safety.  It 
is established federal law under Whren that when the factual 
predicates for a warrant exception exist, a search or seizure is valid 
without further inquiry into whether the motivation for the search 
is aligned with the policy underlying the exception.280  Disregard for 
the subjective motivation of a search or seizure is, indeed, the sine 
qua non of the objective standard. 
 The Alaska Supreme Court followed the objective standard in 
McCoy and Schraff, cases concerning the permissible scope of 
warrantless searches and seizures.  The court twice declined to 
adopt the reasoning of Justice Rabinowitz, who advocated a 
subjective approach in his dissents to both cases.281  As Justice 
Rabinowitz articulated his position in Schraff: “[The warrant 
exceptions’ rationale] provide[s] the theoretical and practical 
justification for departure from the constitutional requirement [of a 
 
 278. Prior discussion of the inventory exception illustrates greater restrictions 
on the scope of searches, whereas discussion of probable-cause and investigatory 
stops illustrates greater restrictions on the attainment of a warrant exception. 
 279. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 460–63 (1981) (examining the scope 
of vehicle searches after arrest).  This case illustrates that the scope of a search of 
an automobile is limited. 
 280. The Washington Supreme Court held the opposite in Ladson, requiring 
that the motivation of the search align with the underlying policy.  See State v. 
Ladson, 979 P.2d 833, 842–43 (Wash. 1999).  The Ladson case is described supra at 
Part II.D. 
 281. See supra notes 157–64 and accompanying text. 
02__DESAI.DOC 1/10/2007  8:47 AM 
262 ALASKA LAW REVIEW [23:235 
warrant] . . . [and further] these same justifications provide relevant 
criteria for delineation of the permissible degree of intensity of a 
warrantless search of the person incident to a lawful arrest.”282  
Indeed, focus on alignment of the motivation for a search and the 
policy underlying the exception validating that search was the 
touchstone of Justice Rabinowitz’s analysis.  Given the court’s 
reluctance to adopt subjective considerations in McCoy and Schraff 
with respect to the valid scope of warrantless searches, it follows 
that subjective considerations would be similarly irrelevant in the 
context of pretextual searches. 
Nor does an analysis of the privacy-rights implications of 
searches and seizures support adoption of a subjective standard.  
Indeed, the court in McCoy declined to adopt a subjective 
standard, stating that “to require a warrant in the circumstances of 
this case would be a futile gesture which could hamstring legitimate 
police action without offering meaningful protection to the 
arrestee.”283  Thus, an issue of great concern for the court should be 
whether the subjective test offers meaningful protection to a 
detainee potentially subjected to a pretextual search.  It does not.  
As discussed, it is beyond dispute that probable-cause traffic stops 
are valid.  A subjective test would do little to increase privacy 
because it is unworkable—police, aware of the test, could simply 
misrepresent their subjective motivation.  Indeed, an attempt to 
neutralize misrepresentation, such as through a policy that all 
traffic law violators be stopped, would invade the privacy of even 
more Alaskans.  Nor would a subjective test provide additional 
privacy protections to vulnerable groups because the Equal 
Protection Clause already protects them from discriminatory police 
behavior.284 
Furthermore, the subjective test would hamstring legitimate 
police action.  Not only would officers be required to indicate their 
subjective motives for all stops, but police officers would be 
deterred from addressing criminal behavior that is uncovered when 
they make a routine traffic stop, thereby facilitating criminal 
activity.  Even if officers were acting properly to prevent or impede 
 
 282. Schraff v. State, 544 P.2d 834, 849 (Alaska 1975) (Rabinowitz, C.J., 
concurring and dissenting). 
 283. McCoy v. State, 491 P.2d 127, 138 (Alaska 1971). 
 284. The Alaska Constitution confirms this result, as its equal protection 
language is even broader than that of the U.S. Constitution.  Compare ALASKA 
CONST. art I, § 1 (“all persons are equal and entitled to equal rights, opportunities, 
and protection under the law”), with U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“No State 
shall . . . deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.”).   
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criminal activity, a subjective standard would invite substantial post 
hoc litigation. Finally, the subjective standard would produce a 
chilling effect by discouraging police officers from following good 
police intuition. Consequently, following the policy rationale from 
McCoy, the subjective test is not preferable. 
Neither the reasonable officer standard nor a modified version 
of it should be adopted under the Alaska Constitution.  No state 
follows the reasonable officer standard, and only two circuits have 
found the standard to be valid.285  Even then, the Eleventh Circuit 
questioned the standard’s application to probable-cause stops.286  In 
fact, the Tenth Circuit had found its application entirely 
untenable.287  In addition, it is difficult to establish who the 
reasonable officer is or how reasonable police practice is defined,288 
whether the reasonable officer or practice is reasonable for the 
entire State of Alaska, reasonable for the local community, or 
reasonable for that particular officer based on his or her history. 
Another problem with the reasonable officer standard is its 
potential to violate separation of powers within the Alaska 
Constitution.  The reasonable officer standard allows the courts to 
definitively determine which traffic laws an officer should or should 
not enforce under the circumstances.  This judicial determination 
trenches on the executive branch’s power to determine when and 
how to enforce the law.  Finally, like the subjective standard, the 
reasonable officer standard does not afford the individual any 
greater level of protection. 
In conclusion, the proper and thorough analysis of the Alaska 
Constitution supports an interpretation that pretextual searches 
and seizures should follow the objective standard. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Although most of the court systems in the nation have 
definitively addressed the issue of pretextual searches and seizures, 
the Alaska courts have actively avoided addressing the issue.  
Other than Washington, all the court systems that have addressed 
the issue of pretexts have adopted the objective standard.289  
However, Alaska has indirectly and through improper legal 
analysis adopted a reasonable officer standard.  In the interest of 
justice, it is imperative that Alaska finally address the pretext issue 
 
 285. See supra notes 87–88 and accompanying text. 
 286. United States v. Smith, 799 F.2d 704, 709 (11th Cir. 1986). 
 287. United States v. Botero-Ospina, 71 F.3d 783, 786 (10th Cir. 1995). 
 288. See id. 
 289. See supra text accompanying notes 106–08. 
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under a thorough, proper legal analysis.  Such an analysis would 
reveal that the Alaska Constitution supports the objective standard 
and that neither the reasonable officer standard nor the subjective 
standard is supported under the constitution’s greater protection 
for privacy. 
